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AND THE WINNER IS... INTERPRETING THE LEAD PLAINTIFF
AND THE LEAD COUNSEL PROVISIONS OF THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT OF 1995
"The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect inves-
tors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation announces that it discovered "accounting irregulari-
ties" in its financial statements. 2 As a result, the value of its stock drops by
more than 47% and shareholders lose more than $20 billion in market
capitalization. 3 The injured investors decide to join their claims and file a
1. PRIVATE SECURITIEs LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, H.R. CONF. REP. 104-
369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 761.
2. See generally Paul A. Ferrillo, New Tide Rising in Securities Class Action Litiga-
tion, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2000, at 1 n.8 (defining accounting "irregularity" as "inten-
tional misstatements or omissions of disclosures"); Lawrence Richter Quinn,
Accounting Sleuths, STRATEGIC FINANCE, Oct. 1, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL
11723026 (discussing reasons for number of highly publicized accounting irregu-
larities cases over past couple of years). "The pressure to meet Wall Street expecta-
tions apparently remains the predominant reason why companies commit
accounting fraud." Id. at 4-5.
3. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
that defendant announced accounting irregularities in its Form 10-K Annual Re-
port filed with SEC, which caused its stock to fall 47% next day, additional 9% four
months later and additional 11% one month later); In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that stock declined in
value during alleged fraud from $67 to $13); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79
F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that defendant announced in
press release that defendant would have to restate its earnings for past year based
on "improperly recognized" $40 million causing stock to decrease dramatically).
Public acknowledgment of accounting irregularities may cause a loss in share
value that may result in a substantial loss in market capital. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at
221-22 (recognizing that shareholders of defendant corporation lost more than
$20 billion in market capital); Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (stating that
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class action lawsuit for securities fraud. 4 The court now must decide who
will represent the class as the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel. 5
4. See generally, FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) (listing rules for filing class action suit).
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Class actions alleging securities fraud are brought to court pursuant to
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. See ElliotJ.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Inves-
tors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2054 n.1
(1995) (listing categories of class action suits). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2000).
5. See generally, FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (stating that in class action court appoints
class representatives); 5-23 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE
§ 23.25 (2001) (stating conditions for appointing lead plaintiff and lead counsel).
Rule 23, at the outset, requires that the representative parties fairly and adequately
protect the interest of the class as a condition to maintenance of a class action. See
id. It has been noted that to determine whether the interests of the class will be
represented adequately:
courts consider the adequacy of both the named representative and class
counsel. Thus, adequate representation requires two elements: (1) the
class representative must not have interests antagonistic to those of the
class, and (2) class counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally
able to conduct the proposed litigation. In determining the adequacy of
the named representative, courts also consider whether the representa-
tive will vigorously advocate the class claims.
Id.
There are benefits and drawbacks in having class representatives act on behalf
of the class. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The
Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 308
n.1 (1985) (comparing benefits and potential conflicts arising from courts hearing
class actions by representative parties). "The class action device enables courts to
hear the claims of a large group of individuals through class representatives and
class attorneys .... [T]he absentee plaintiffs must rely on the class representatives
and class attorneys for the adequate representation of their rights." Id. at 308 n.3.
The class representatives have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the class. See
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (stating that class
representative is volunteer who assumes position of fiduciary nature); In re Oxford
492
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In recognizing the need to guide courts in appointing the lead plain-
tiff and the lead counsel, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).6 The PSLRA was expected to
revolutionize securities fraud class actions by encouraging greater partici-
pation by the investor clients, who traditionally were prevented by counsel
from exercising any decisions in the class action suit.7
Yet, in the six years since its passage, the PSLRA has caused a great
deal of confusion among federal district courts which are struggling to
manage class action suits. 8 Specifically, courts disagree whether the
PSLRA permits them to aggregate the financial interests of multiple unre-
lated investors in deciding whether to appoint the group as lead plaintiff.9
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that class
representative, once designated by court, is fiduciary for absent class members).
6. Pub L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5(1994 & Supp. 1996)). Congress overrode President Clinton's veto when it passed
the PSLRA in December 1995 with a House vote of 319-100 and Senate vote of 68-
30 in December of 1995. See PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM AcT OF 1995,
VETO MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 104-150
(1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H15214-06 (1995); Note, Investor Empowerment
Strategies in the Congressional Reform of Securities Class Action, 109 HARv. L. REv. 2056,
2056 (1996) (emphasizing congressional effort to pass bill over President Clinton's
veto) (citing Aaron Zimer, For First Time, Veto by Clinton Overriden, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 23, 1995, at 1, 16).
The PSLRA establishes procedural requirements to allow other lead plaintiffs
the opportunity to seek appointment. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (stating filing
requirements for securities fraud class action). Following the initial filing of a se-
curities fraud class action, the filing plaintiff must publish notice of the suit to
allow other class members the opportunity to file a motion for lead plaintiff ap-
pointment. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (stating filing requirements for se-
curities fraud class action). Within ninety days after the notice is published, the
court must appoint the most adequate plaintiff. See id. (stating filing requirements
for securities fraud class action). For a further discussion of the statutory require-
ments for appointing the lead plaintiff and lead counsel, see infra notes 31-39 and
accompanying text.
7. See PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM AcT OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-98,
at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (noting Congress' intent to
empower investors so that they, not their lawyers, control securities litigation); see
also William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
397 (2001) (describing that "PSLRA was meant, in no uncertain terms, to return
securities class actions to clients"); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2065 (stat-
ing that plaintiffs' attorneys "typically do not rely on named plaintiffs for vital testi-
mony, do not bargain with them over fees they will be paid, and do not require
named plaintiffs' approval of proposed settlements"). For a further discussion of
problems associated with securities fraud class actions before the enactment of the
PSLRA, see infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
8. SeeJill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001,
at 53, 54 (recognizing substantial uncertainty that remains about operation of lead
plaintiff provision and appropriate method for selecting lead counsel); Andrew K.
Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffs' Lawyers: The Promise
and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 Bus. LAw. 763, 764 (1999)
(recognizing problems associated with lead counsel auctions).
9. Compare In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 269 (3d Cir. 2001) (find-
ing that PSLRA permits aggregating financial interests of unrelated investors), In
3
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Further, courts disagree whether the PSLRA permits them to auction the
position of lead counsel to the lowest bidder without the plaintiff's prior
approval.1 0
This disagreement among federal courts has received considerable at-
tention, especially within the past year.1 1 In August 2001, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal ap-
pellate court to address both issues, and found that aggregation was per-
missible but court-ordered auctions were impermissible. 12 Concerned,
however, by the growing use of auctions by federal courts, the Third Cir-
cuit appointed a Task Force to evaluate their permissibility under the
PSLRA. 13 In October 2001, the Task Force concluded, in a finding that
re Ribozyme Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 192 F.R.D. 656, 662 (D. Colo. 2000) (discuss-
ing that unrelated investors may aggregate their financial interests), In re Nice Sys.
Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 210 (D.N.J. 1999) (same), and In re The Baan Co. Sec.
Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 217 (D.D.C. 1999) (same), with Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc.
78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (rejecting aggregation in favor of ap-
pointing single investor as lead plaintiff), In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171
F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same), In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 803, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (same), and In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (same).
10. Compare In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951, 953 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (finding auction appropriate), In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 780, 784-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same), In re Commtouch Software Ltd. Sec.
Litig., No. 01-C-00719, (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2001) (same), cited in LAURA L. HOOPER
& MARIE LEARY, AUCTIONING THE ROLE OF CLASS COUNSEL IN CLASS ACTION CASES:
A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY 3 n.17 (2001), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/class-
counsel/fjcauctioningrtf_.pdf, In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (same), In re Network Assocs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-
34 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same), Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587-88
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (same), In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 270-71
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (same), In reLucent Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 156-58
(D.N.J. 2000) (same), and Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings,
Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (same), with Cendant, 264 F.3d at 220
(refusing to conduct auction), and In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d
304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
11. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268-83 (deciding this case on August 28,
2001); ThirdJudicial Circuit, Third Circuit Task Force Report (draft report Oct. 3,
2001), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/report-finalchng.pdf
(releasing its preliminary findings in October 2001).
Commentators have also published in 2001 their findings and opinions about
aggregation and auctions. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 53-104 (discussing problems
associated with aggregation and court-ordered auctions in Spring/Summer 2001
issue); HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 1-120 (discussing auctions in descriptive
study published on August 29, 2001).
12. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268-83 (finding that aggregating multiple unre-
lated investors is permissible under PSLRA and finding that auction is impermissi-
ble as matter of first resort). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's
decision in Cendant pertaining to the issue of aggregation, see infra notes 47-55
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's decision on
auctions, see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
13. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that Task
Force was convened to "evaluate emerging practice of several district court judges
throughout country of selecting class counsel and setting fees through a bidding
or auction process"). The Task Force Report specifically stated:
[Vol. 47: p. 491
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may significantly impact securities fraud class actions, that courts should
defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel under a standard of review
similar to the business judgment rule.14 Although time will tell how much
of an impact this finding will have among federal courts, the business judg-
ment rule is an appropriate standard of review.1 5
On January 30, 2001, the opinion author, acting as Chief Circuit Judge
and Presiding Officer of the Third Circuit Judicial Council, announced
the formation of a Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel whose
primary duty is to assess the propriety and efficacy of the use of the auc-
tion method in its various applications, and to formulate recommenda-
tions for the bench, bar, and public.
Cendant, 264 F.3d, at 258 n.36. The press release containing this announcement is
available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/taskforce.pdf. Other press
releases relating to the 2001 Task Force, a list of questions that it is addressing,
witness statements, and transcripts of the proceedings are all available at http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/public.htm.
Some of the questions presented to the Task Force included: (1) whether
auctioning tends to create a better result for class members than traditional ap-
pointment, (2) whether the auction process unfairly benefits large firms over small
firms, (3) whether auction discourages plaintiff's attorneys from conducting a
thorough pre-complaint investigation, (4) whether the costs associated with tradi-
tional appointment of class counsel (e.g., ex post fee determinations) are elimi-
nated or reduced by auctioning and (5) whether the costs associated with
auctioning are greater or less than those associated with traditional appointment.
See Third Judicial Circuit, List of Questions to Be Addressed by Third Circuit Task Force
on Appointment of Counsel in Class Actions, available at http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/Questions/ Listofquestions.pdf. For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit Task Force's findings, see infra notes 180-83 and accom-
panying text.
14. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 88 (recommending
that "scrutiny akin to the business judgment rule, ordinarily applied in the context
of corporate board decisions, should be applied to the lead plaintiffs choice of
counsel and to the fee arrangements"). In reaching its decision, the Task Force
received information from practicing attorneys who supported the use of the busi-
ness judgment rule. See id. app. B, at 5-6 (statement by Keith Johnson) (stating
that court must defer to counsel selection decisions made by lead plaintiff under
business judgment rule). According to other practicing attorneys, the business
judgment rule would create a presumption that the decision will be left undis-
turbed as long as it was made in good faith and on an informed basis. See id. app.
B, at 5 (statement by Stuart M. Grant & Jay W. Eisenhofer) (supporting use of
business judgment rule).
15. For a discussion and analysis of the applicability of the business judgment
rule to court-ordered auctions, see infra notes 184-235 and accompanying text.
Courts and scholars found that the results of the 1985 Third Circuit Task Force
Report had a significant impact on the method in which courts considered the
lodestar method. See Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, 681 A.2d 1039, 1047 (Del.
1996) (stating that 1985 Third Circuit Task Force report was significant event that
led courts to reconsider lodestar method of calculating common fund fee awards)
(citing Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108
F.R.D. 237, 255 (1985)); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1012 (2000) (recognizing impact of 1985
Third Circuit Task Force Report). For a discussion of the business judgment rule
and its applicability to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, see infta notes 124-30
and accompanying text.
5
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This Comment argues that, consistent with the statutory text of the
PSLRA, aggregating the financial interests of a small number of investors
is permissible; however, auctions as a first choice among courts are imper-
missible under the business judgment rule.1 6 Part II of this Comment dis-
cusses the PSLRA.17 Part III summarizes court analyses of aggregation.) 8
Part IV argues that the PSLRA permits aggregating a small number of in-
vestors. 19 Part V discusses court-ordered auctions and the business judg-
ment rule.2 0 Part VI summarizes court analyses of court-ordered auctions
and the Task Force's analysis of auctions. 21 Part VII argues that a court
must defer to the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel under a standard of
review similar to the business judgment rule, but tinder limited circum-
stances may order an auction. 2 2
II. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORm ACT OF 1995
Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, securities class actions typically
were characterized as "abusive" and "lawyer-driven" lawsuits in which client
investors had little or no control over their counsel's decisions. 23 Courts
traditionally appointed the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel on a "first
come, first serve" basis.24 As a result, lawyers were anxious to file the first
16. For a discussion and analysis of aggregation, see infra notes 75-115 and
accompanying text. For a discussion and analysis of the business judgment rule
and its applicability on auctions, see infra notes 184-235 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the PSLRA, see infra notes 23-43 and accompanying
text.
18. For a discussion and summary of court analyses of aggregation, see infra
notes 44-74 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion and analysis that the PSLRA permits aggregation, see in-
fra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of court-ordered auctions and the background of the bus-
iness judgment rule, see infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of court analyses and the Third Circuit Task Force find-
ings on court-ordered auctions, see infra notes 144-83.
22. For a discussion and analysis of the business judgment rule as applied to
court-ordered auctions, see infra notes 184-239 and accompanying text.
23. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4-12, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683-691
(determining, based on extensive testimony, that lawyers engaged in abusive prac-
tices in federal system by filing "strike suits"). The Securities Subcommittee recog-
nized that lawyers filed suits on behalf of "professional plaintiffs" who made it "easy
for lawyers to find individuals willing to play the role of wronged investor for pur-
poses of filing a class action lawsuit." See id. at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 689 (recognizing need to eliminate abusive practice of lawyers selecting pro-
fessional plaintiff in order to file frivolous suit). As a result, lawyers were known to
have used securities class actions as their own personal vehicles. See Weiss & Beck-
erman, supra note 4, at 2065 (acknowledging that plaintiffs' attorneys seek to ad-
vance their own financial interests, rather than interests of investors they purport
to represent).
24. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (stating
that courts appointed plaintiff and counsel based on who filed first complaint);
Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2062 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers created
"race to the courthouse" to file the first complaint).
[Vol. 47: p. 491
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complaint and refrained from engaging in adequate discovery or using
diligence to draft it.25 Further, lawyers selected "professional plaintiffs"
because these types of plaintiffs had little financial stake in the litigation
and therefore lacked incentive to monitor the lawyers effectively. 26 As a
result, lawyers used class actions as their "personal vehicles" and made de-
cisions that reflected their personal financial interests rather than the in-
terests of the class. 2 7
As a means of preventing abusive practices and increasing client con-
trol, Congress had two goals. 28 First, Congress sought to have courts ap-
point a plaintiff with the largest financial stake in the suit because
presumably this type of plaintiff actively would monitor decisions made by
the lead counsel and seek the highest return.29 Second, Congress sought
25. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (recog-
nizing that lawyers spent minimal time preparing complaints in securities class ac-
tions because first lawsuit filed also renders lead plaintiff); Fisch, supra note 8, at 57
(same). Three problems emerged as a consequence of appointing the lawyer who
filed the first complaint:
First, lawyers [were] encouraged to file complaints rapidly and defer their
investigation of the merits of those complaints until after filing. Second,
to file a complaint rapidly, lawyers [were required to] seek out prospec-
tive plaintiffs rather than wait[ ] to be approached by a disgruntled inves-
tor. Finally, class counsel [was] appointed with little consideration given
to qualifications.
Id.
26. See S. REp. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (stat-
ing that "proliferation of professional plaintiffs made it easy for lawyers to find
individuals willing to play role of wronged investor for purposes of filing class ac-
tion lawsuit"); H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
732 (noting that professional plaintiffs often received bounty payments or bonuses
by counsel for serving as lead plaintiff); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp.
2d 803, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1999) ("All professional plaintiff share one very important
characteristic in common, however: they have relatively small amounts of money
invested in any one security and typically suffer relatively small financial losses.").
27. See generally Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2065 (recognizing that
plaintiffs' attorneys advanced their own financial interests, rather than interests of
investors they purported to represent, not only by taking initiative in filing class
actions, but by manner in which they conducted and agreed to settle such litiga-
tion). In a settlement agreement, "plaintiffs' attorneys typically did not rely on
[the] plaintiffs for vital testimony, did not bargain with plaintiffs over the fees they
[would] be paid, and did not require plaintiffs' approval of the terms on which
they propose[d] to settle class actions." See id.
Further, the Rules of Professional Conduct rarely constrained attorneys in
class actions because class members failed to actively monitor their attorney's con-
duct. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.14 (1986) (noting con-
tinued difficulty in preventing lawyer-driven litigation).
28. For a further discussion of reform of the securities class action system, see
infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
29. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (rec-
ognizing that courts would be more confident of settlements negotiated under
supervision of large investors because such investors have same interests as plaintiff
class generally). The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
intended this provision to increase the likelihood that institutional investors would
serve as lead plaintiff by requiring that the plaintiff have the largest financial inter-
7
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to have the lead plaintiff select and retain lead counsel as a further means
for the plaintiff to control counsel's decisions.3 0 Therefore, in adopting
the PSLRA, Congress incorporated both goals within the lead plaintiff pro-
vision and the lead counsel provision.3 1
The lead plaintiff provision states, in pertinent part, that the court
appoint as lead plaintiff "the member or members of the purported plaintiff
class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately represent-
ing the interests of class members .... ,,32 The provision further requires
est. See id. (noting that system before PSLRA often prevented institutional inves-
tors from selecting counsel or serving as lead plaintiff in class actions). As one
representative of institutional investors stated before the Committee, "[a]s the
largest shareholders in most companies, we are the ones who have the most to gain
from meritorious securities litigation." Private Litigation Under Federal Securities
Laws: Hearing on H.R 1058 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Maryellen F. Andersen, Council of
Institutional Investors).
Monitoring of counsel by institutional investors was expected to yield three
benefits. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2121-23 (recognizing benefits of
institutional investors serving as lead plaintiff). First, the size of the institutional
investors' stakes suggests that they are likely to be reasonably diligent to ensure
that plaintiffs' counsel effectively represent their interests and the interest of the
plaintiff class. See id. at 2121 (stating larger stakes corresponds to increase in dili-
gence in monitoring counsel).
Second, the number of frivolous suits filed would supposedly decrease be-
cause the institutional plaintiffs would be more sensitive to their costs on publicly
traded companies. See id. at 2122 (noting that investors would want to discourage
strike suits because such suits impose substantial costs directly on defendant corpo-
rations and indirectly on corporations' shareholders); R. Chris Heck, Comment,
Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under
the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1205 (1999) (recognizing that lawyers would
hesitate to file frivolous suits if their actions were effectively monitored). Third,
institutional investors would prevent more cases from settling because actual litiga-
tion would clarify substantive law and provide a public benefit. See Weiss & Becker-
man, supra note 4, at 2123 (stating that clarifying rules governing corporations'
disclosure responsibilities should reduce corporations' costs).
As a result of the PSLRA, institutional investors "are developing ongoing rela-
tionships with plaintiffs' firms and increasing sophistication in evaluating and ne-
gotiating fee arrangements." See Fisch, supra note 8, at 62 (discussing one result of
encouraging institutional investors under PSRLA).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v) (stating that plaintiff selects and retains
counsel with approval of court); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11-12, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690-91 (stating that Congress intended to permit most ade-
quate plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have counsel choose plaintiff); Fisch,
supra note 8, at 78 (stating that lead counsel provision enhances lead plaintiff's
ability to monitor the litigation) (citing Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2107).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (referring to statutory text of lead plaintiff
and lead counsel provisions); Fisch, supra note 8, at 60-62 (stating that Congress
incorporated in PSLRA means to create greater client control).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (emphasis added). The lead plaintiff provi-
sion states, in scattered parts:
(i) IN GENERAL - Not later than 90 days after the date on which a no-
tice is published . . . the court shall consider any motion made by a pur-
ported class member in response to the notice, including any motion by a
class member who is not individually named as a plaintiff in the com-
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that the court adopt a rebuttable presumption that "the most adequate
plaintiff... is the person or group of persons that ... in the determination
of the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class;
and . . . otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.13 3 The lead counsel provision states that "[t] he
most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select
and retain counsel to represent the class."3 4
Based on the lead plaintiff provision, courts must determine whether
the prospective lead plaintiff has the largest financial interest, can ade-
quately represent the interests of the class and can satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35 In determining a
plaintiffs financial interest, courts typically evaluate three factors: (1) the
number of shares purchased by the prospective plaintiff during the class
period, (2) the total net funds expended by the plaintiffs during the class
period and (3) the approximate losses suffered during the class period.3 6
plaint or complaints, and shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or
members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines the
most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members
(hereafter in this paragraph referred to as the 'most adequate plaintiff")
in accordance with this subparagraph....
(iii) REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION -
IN GENERAL - . . . [Flor purposes of clause (i), the court shall
adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private
action arising under this title is the person or group of persons that -
(aa) has either filed the complaint or made a motion in re-
sponse to a notice...
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial
interest in the relief sought by the class; and
(cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i)-(iii).
The lead counsel provision provides:
(v) SELECTION OF LEAD COUNSEL - The most adequate plain-
tiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to
represent the class.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (emphasis added).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (stating three factors that courts evalu-
ate in securities class action); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 262-
68 (3d Cir. 2001) (identifying presumptive lead plaintiff by evaluating plaintiff's
financial interest and adequacy as required under lead plaintiff provision and Rule
23); In re The Baan Company Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D 214, 216-18 (D.D.C 1999)
(determining whether group of investors has largest financial interest and can ade-
quately represent class); In re Microstrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427,
433 n.11 (E.D. Va. 2000) (stating that more than one class member may satisfy
adequacy requirement, but only one person may have. largest financial stake in
litigation).
36. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 262 (identifying factors to consider in determin-
ing financial interest); Lax v. First Merchants Acceptance Corp., 1997 WL 461036,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1997) (same); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d
286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); In re Ribozyme Pharm. Inc. Sec. Litig., 192 F.R.D.
9
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As discussed later, when multiple investors are seeking appointment, some
courts have aggregated or combined their financial interests in determin-
ing which plaintiff group has the largest financial interest.3
7
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like the PSLRA, re-
quires that the plaintiff adequately represent the interests of the class.
3 8
In determining the adequacy of the prospective plaintiff under the PSLRA
and Rule 23, several courts have evaluated whether the investor is able and
willing to vigorously represent the claims of the class, has no conflicting
claims with those of the class and can select competent class counsel to
represent the class.39
656, 660-61 (D. Colo. 2000) (same). In Ribozyme, the court evaluated two groups of
investors, the "Ribozyme Lead Plaintiffs" and the "Ribozyme Shareholders." See id.
(utilizing four-part test in determining lead plaintiff). The Ribozyme Lead Plain-
tiff purchased 8,500 shares during the class period, purchased 8,500 net shares
during the class period, expended $154,250 in total net funds and suffered ap-
proximate losses of $75,093.75. See id. The Ribozyme Shareholders purchased
7,000 shares during the class period, purchased 5,000 net shares during the class
period, expended $96,075 in net funds during the class period, and lost $53,428.
See id. Based on this careful evaluation, the court determined that the Ribozyme
Lead Plaintiff had the largest financial interest in the lawsuit. See id.
37. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 223 (finding district court decision appropri-
ate in appointing presumptive lead plaintiff group whose alleged combined losses
totaled more than $89 million while largest amount alleged by other movant group
was $10.6 million); In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d
1208, 1211 (D.N.M. 1998) (finding that financial loss by six investors can be aggre-
gated in appointing them as lead plaintiff); In re Informix Corp. Sec. Litig., 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23687, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1997) (evaluating aggregate
losses of two movant groups before appointing lead plaintiff group); In re Ride,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23689 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 1997) (stating
that "it is clear that the 'financial interest' of plaintiffs aligned together should be
computed by aggregating their claims"). For a further discussion of aggregation,
see infra notes 44-115 and accompanying text.
38. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (stating "representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class"), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i)
(stating that court "shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members or the
purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of ade-
quately representing the interests of class members .... ).
39. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 265 (discussing criteria of court's inquiry into
adequacy of prospective plaintiffs); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.,
960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Under Rule 23(a) (4), adequacy of representa-
tion is measured by two standards. First, class counsel must be 'qualified, exper-
ienced and generally able' to conduct the litigation. Second, the class members
must not have interests that are 'antagonistic' to one another."); Lerwill v. Inflight
Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]wo criteria for deter-
mining the adequacy of representation have been recognized. First, the named
representatives must appear able to prosecute the action vigorously through quali-
fied counsel, and second, the representatives must not have antagonistic or con-
flicting interests with the unnamed members of the class."); In re Quintus Sec.
Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating court must determine whether
plaintiff with largest loss has negotiated with counsel adequately in determining
whether adequacy requirement is met); The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 225 (stating
that proposed lead plaintiff should provide full information about "group" in or-
der for court to analyze group's adequacy). The court in The Baan Co. stated:
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Since Congress adopted the PSLRA, courts have disagreed over the
proper interpretation of the lead plaintiff provision and the lead counsel
provision. 40 First, courts have disagreed over whether they can appoint
multiple unrelated investors to serve as lead plaintiff and whether it can
aggregate their financial interests in the litigation in determining which
prospective lead plaintiff has the largest financial stake.4 1 Second, courts
have disagreed over whether they should defer to the lead plaintiffs
choice of counsel or actively engage in the selection process for lead coun-
sel. 4 2 A proper interpretation of these two provisions is necessary to pro-
[T]he proposed lead plaintiff should provide full information about the
"group" . . . includ[ing] detailed descriptions of its members, including
their background, experience, and capabilities relating to the role of lead
plaintiff; any pre-existing relationships among them; the manner in
which the "group" was formed; an explanation of how its members would
function collectively; and a description of the mechanism that the group
members and lead counsel have established to communicate with one
another about the litigation.
The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 225.
The group is deemed adequate if they have no competing interests with an-
other and they are able to select counsel that is sufficiently competent to conduct
litigation. See Heck, supra note 29, at 1209 (stating that adequacy requires class
counsel selected by class representative be sufficiently competent to conduct litiga-
tion and class members not have antagonistic interests).
40. For a discussion of the disagreement among courts over the proper inter-
pretation of the lead plaintiff provision, see infra notes 44-74 and accompanying
text.
41. Compare Cendant, 264 F.3d at 265 (determining that three unrelated pen-
sion funds can adequately represent class upon showing "willingness and ability to
select competent class counsel and negotiate reasonable retainer agreement with
that counsel"), and In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litg., 182 F.R.D. 42, 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that three unrelated investors satisfy adequacy require-
ment because no conflict of interest between any of plaintiffs and members of class
existed and plaintiff obtained qualified, experienced counsel), with In re Waste
Mgmt. Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (finding pre-litigation rela-
tionship must exist based on more than their losing investment to satisfy terms of
PSLRA), In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(finding that group of unrelated investors "cobbled together" by efforts of lawyer
renders them inadequate), and In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156,
157 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting group of unrelated investors).
Some courts have found that aggregation may be permitted when the inves-
tors are related, meaning they have a union that exists by more than the mere
happenstance, such as in a partnership, members of a family or among various
subsidiaries of a corporation. See, e.g., The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 225 (stating that
court may aggregate larger number of investors if pre-existing relationship among
group members exists); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 816
(N.D. Ohio 1999) (stating that large group cannot adequately control counsel un-
less there is relationship among them); Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (stating
that eighteen-member group is inadequate based on fact that they have no prior
relationship and therefore cannot "collectively ride herd on counsel anywhere as
well as could a single sophisticated entity").
42. Compare Cendant, 264 F.3d at 276 (stating that court will defer to lead
plaintiff's choice of counsel if it was result of good faith selection and negotiation
process, and was arrived at through meaningful arms-length bargaining), and In re
Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that court should
2002]
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vide the courts with an appropriate method of selecting the class
representatives. 43
Ill. SUMMARY OF COURT ANALYSES OF AGGREGATION
Courts disagree over whether they can aggregate the financial inter-
ests of multiple unrelated investors in deciding which prospective plaintiff
has the largest financial interest.44 In making this decision, courts have
examined the statutory text and the legislative history of the PSLRA to
determine whether more than one investor can serve as lead plaintiff.4 5
Then, courts have evaluated whether multiple investors, with no common
bond other than a similarly suffered financial loss, can vigorously serve the
interests of the class, select competent counsel and monitor the litigation;
in other words, can unrelated investors "adequately" serve the interests of
the class.
46
A. Courts that Permit Aggregation
Recently, in In re Cendant Corporation Litigation,4 7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that the PSLRA permits
not substitute its judgement for that of lead plaintiff if lead plaintiff adequately
negotiated with counsel), with In re Bank One S'holder Class Actions, 96 F. Supp.
2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding auction appropriate to obtain lower fee for
class counsel).
43. For a discussion and analysis of the PSLRA's lead plaintiff and lead coun-
sel provisions, see infra notes 75-115, 185-239 and accompanying text.
44. Compare Cendant, 264 F.3d at 269 (holding that PSLRA permits aggregat-
ing financial interests of unrelated investors), In re Ribozyme Pharms., Inc., Sec.
Litig., 192 F.R.D. 656, 662 (D. Colo. 2000) (same), In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188
F.R.D. 206, 214-17 (D.N.J. 1999) (same), and The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 217
(same), with Sakhrani, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (rejecting aggregation in favor of ap-
pointing single investor as lead plaintiff), Donnkenny, 171 F.R.D. at 157-58 (same),
Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 813 ("Such a 'group' would be a 'lead' plaintiff in name
only, in substance, those individuals would essentially constitute a collection of
lead plaintiffs, unbound by any allegiance to one another and unlikely to function
as a unified whole."), and Waste Mgmt., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 413 (S.D. Tex. 2000)
(rejecting aggregation).
45. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266 (evaluating statutory text of PSLRA and
finding that multiple investors can serve as lead plaintiff); Waste Mgmt., 128 F.
Supp. 2d at 412 (finding that "group" must demonstrate cohesiveness to be ap-
pointed lead plaintiff).
46. Compare Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266 (permitting unrelated investors to aggre-
gate), Ribozyme, 192 F.R.D. at 662 (appointing lead plaintiff group of four inves-
tors); Nice Sys., 188 F.R.D. at 210 (D.N.J. 1999) (allowing aggregation of proposed
plaintiffs who met requirements), and The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 217 (appointing
triumvirate of investors), with Waste Mgmt., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 412-13 (declining to
appoint unrelated investors as lead plaintiff); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.,
79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same); Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at
809-13 (same); Donnkenny, 171 F.R.D. at 157-58 (same).
47. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).
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aggregation. 48 In that case, several individual investors, as appellants, ap-
pealed the district court's decision to appoint three unrelated institutional
investors as lead plaintiff.49 First, the appellants argued that the PSLRA
does not permit more than one investor to serve as lead plaintiff and, sec-
ond, that unrelated investors cannot adequately serve the interests of the
class.50 The Third Circuit rejected both arguments and first determined
that the term "group of persons" under the lead plaintiff provision means
that more than one investor can serve as lead plaintiff.
5
'
Second, the court agreed with the district court that a relationship
between the investors prior to the litigation is unnecessary in order to
serve as lead plaintiff.52 According to the Third Circuit, the correct con-
struction of the PSLRA is whether the group can serve the interests of the
class adequately, not whether they are related.53 In evaluating the group's
adequacy, the court determined that: (1) the group demonstrated a will-
ingness and ability to represent the claims of the class vigorously, (2) its
members had experience serving as plaintiffs in prior lawsuits, (3) it se-
lected competent class counsel and (4) it negotiated a reasonable fee
agreement with counsel. 54 As a result, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision to appoint three institutional investors as lead
plaintiff.5
5
The Central District of California in Takeda v. Turbodyne Technologies,
Inc.56 and other district courts have likewise found that aggregation is per-
missible.57 In Takeda, the court agreed to aggregate the financial interests
48. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266-68 (holding that three unrelated investors can
be aggregated).
49. See id. at 221-24 (stating facts of case). In this case, fifteen individuals filed
motions to serve as lead plaintiff. See id. at 223. One of the plaintiff groups, the
CaIPERS Group, was a consortium of three of the largest publicly-managed pen-
sion funds in the United States. See id. The District Court appointed this group as
the lead plaintiff. See id. Four investors who sought lead plaintiff appointment
appealed this decision to the Third Circuit. See id. at 230.
50. See id. at 243 (stating facts of case).
51. See id. at 266-67 (finding that court must make threshold adequacy deter-
mination whether movant with largest interest in relief sought is group rather than
individual person or entity) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (I)).
52. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268 (stating that district court identified most
adequate plaintiff).
53. See id. at 266 ("The statute contains no requirement mandating that the
members of a proper group be 'related' in some manner; it requires only that any
such group 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.').
54. See id. at 267-68 (affirming district court's decision that adequacy require-
ment under Rule 23 and PSLRA was satisfied). The court also recognized that
there was no indication that the group was created artificially by its lawyers, and
the fact that the group contains three members offers no reason to doubt that its
members could operate effectively as a single unit. See id. (agreeing that adequacy
requirement satisfied).
55. See id. at 268 (finding district court did not abuse its discretion).
56. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
57. See e.g., In reThe First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641-44
(W.D.N.C. 2000) (appointing three individuals and one institutional investor as
2002]
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of seven non-institutional investors. 58 The court found that these mem-
bers were adequate to serve together as lead plaintiff because: (1) they had
a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure that the action
would be prosecuted vigorously, (2) they had a common interest in the
litigation and (3) they had retained adequate counsel. 59 As a result, the
court appointed the group as lead plaintiff.60
B. Courts Refusing to Aggregate Unrelated Investors in PSLRA Cases
Some courts have argued that the PSLRA does not permit aggrega-
tion if either counsel forms the group for the purpose of obtaining lead
counsel appointment, or if the group consists of unrelated investors.6' In
the first instance, several courts followed the line of reasoning of the
Southern District of New York in In re Razorfish, Inc. Securities Litigation62 by
refusing to permit "lawyer-driven aggregation. '63 In contrast to the facts
in Cendant, where the investors joined together and selected their counsel
as part of a group decision, the investors in Razorfish did not select their
counsel or join together on their own initiative, but rather were grouped
lead plaintiff); In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 114-15 (D.N.J. 1999) (ap-
pointing institutional investor and individual investor as lead plaintiff); In re Nice
Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206, 220-223 (D.N.J. 1999) (appointing group of five
individuals as lead plaintiff); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 286, 296-
97 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (consolidating action of four investors to serve as group and
subsequently appointing this group as lead plaintiff).
58. See Takeda v. Turbodyne Tech., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137-38 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (finding adequacy of group, not relationship, as proper threshold ques-
tion). In this case, two plaintiff groups, each with hundreds of class plaintiffs,
moved for appointment as lead plaintiff. See id. at 1130 (stating facts of case). The
court denied the motion, finding that both groups were unwieldy and not capable
of directing the litigation effectively. See id. at 1131. The groups then proposed
that a smaller subset of persons be collectively denominated as lead plaintiffs. See
id. The court appointed one group with seven members that had suffered losses
approaching $1 million. See id.
59. See id. at 1137 (identifying factors to determine group's adequacy).
60. See id. (holding that group of seven was adequate to serve as lead
plaintiff).
61. See, e.g., Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (S.D. Ind.
1999) (rejecting aggregation of unrelated investors in favor of appointing one in-
vestor as lead plaintiff); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146,
1154 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same); In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304,
309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that because group of unrelated investors "has no
independent existence and its composite members have no prior relationship,
there is nothing to suggest that they will collectively ride herd on counsel any-
where as well as could a single sophisticated entity").
62. 143 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
63. See Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (refusing to appoint group organized
by lawyer's desire to "obtain oligopolistic profits"); Aronson, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1152-
54 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (recognizing purpose of PSLRA is to replace lawyer-driven
litigation); In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig. 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that one principal purpose of PSLRA is to prevent lawyer-driven
litigation).
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together by counsel. 64 The court denied this group's motion for lead
plaintiff appointment because the group could not vigorously represent
the interests of the class or effectively communicate with one another.65
In addition, the court found that this type of "lawyer-driven" litigation
runs afoul of the legislative history of the PSLRA in which Congress sought
to prevent lawyer-driven litigation in favor of client-driven litigation. 66
Some district courts have followed the Northern District of Ohio's
reasoning in In re Telxon Corp. Securities Litigation67 by refusing to aggregate
investors when their only common relationship is based on a financial in-
terest in the litigation. 68 In Telxon, two groups filed a motion for lead
counsel appointment, the first having eighteen unrelated investors and
the second having two unrelated investors. 69 The court rejected the mo-
tion by the group of eighteen investors because, according to the court,
such a large group precludes any single member of the group and the
group as a whole from exercising control over the litigation. 70 The court
reasoned that it is more difficult for each member to communicate with
64. See Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (stating that members of group had
no prior connection with each other or with each other's counsel). In this case,
counsel grouped together a large financial institution, two smaller "day-trading"
companies and an individual investor, and then moved the court to appoint them
as lead plaintiff. See id. (stating facts of case).
65. See id. at 308-09 (finding that group could not satisfy adequacy require-
ment under PSLRA and Rule 23 and therefore could not be appointed lead
plaintiff).
66. See id. at 308 (recognizing that group was "simply an artifice cobbled to-
gether by cooperating counsel"). For a further discussion and analysis of the legis-
lative history of the PSLRA, see infra notes 85-86, 105-08 and accompanying text.
67. 67 F. Supp. 2d 803 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
68. See In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 823 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (refusing to aggregate group when members of group have no pre-existing
relationship or association); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (adopting narrow view in which unrelated investors
cannot aggregate); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (S.D. Ind.
1999) (rejecting aggregation in favor of appointing single investor as lead plain-
tiff); In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig. 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(same).
69. See Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 809-10 (stating facts of case). In this case, the
Alsin Group and the Hayman Group sought lead plaintiff appointment. See id. at
808 (stating facts). The Alsin Group consisted of eighteen individual plaintiffs
who collectively held approximately 332,000 shares of Telxon common stock and
allegedly suffered losses of approximately $3.0 million during a class period de-
fined as May 8, 1998 through January 27, 1999. See id. The Hayman Group con-
sisted of three individuals, two of whom were brothers who collectively lost $1.24
million. See id. at 809. The third member had lost $156,643 but had no apparent
prior or contemporaneous relationship or association with the brothers. See id.
70. See id. 809-10 (finding that eighteen-member group cannot call itself
"group" under PSLRA). The court examined the plain and ordinary meaning of
the term "group" in the dictionary and found that the term refers to a relatively
small number of individuals assembled together. See id. at 811 (interpreting lan-
guage of PSLRA).
15
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the other members and to speak with a single coherent voice when coun-
sel "drives" the group together. 7 1
As to the group of two unrelated investors, the court similarly rejected
aggregating their financial interests. 72 According to the court, unrelated
investors cannot speak or act with a uniform purpose and therefore can-
not monitor effectively the decisions by their counsel. 73 As a result of this
decision, and the courts that follow its line of reasoning, a disagreement
exists among courts in deciding whether more than one investor can serve
as lead plaintiff and whether they must have a pre-litigation relationship.74
IV. THE PSLRA PERMITS AGGREGATION
The statutory text of the PSLRA permits a court to aggregate the fi-
nancial interests of unrelated investors provided that the group adequately
represents the interests of the class. 7 5 In order for a group to demonstrate
their adequacy, the legislative history provides only that the group demon-
strate that they can actively represent the class and that it can drive the
litigation. 76 Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history,
however, supports aggregating a large number of investors having small
financial interests in the litigation. 77
A. Aggregating a Small Number of Investors Is Consistent with the PSLRA
In order to accept aggregation, it must be determined that: (1) the
PSLRA permits multiple investors to serve as the lead plaintiff, (2) a prior
relationship to the litigation is not required and (3) the financial interests
of the individual group members should be aggregated. 78 As to the first
determination, the statutory text of the PSLRA explicitly permits more
71. See id. at 816 (describing primary difficulty of having large numbers of
persons comprising group).
72. See id. at 813 (stating that group must consist of more than "mere assem-
blage of unrelated persons who share nothing in common other than the twin for-
tuities that (1) they suffered losses and (2) they entered into retainer agreements
with the same attorney or attorneys").
73. See id. at 815-16 (noting that in larger groups there is less incentive for any
member of group, or group as whole to supervise litigation).
74. Compare In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that three member group of unrelated investors can be aggregated), and
Takeda v. Turbodyne Tech., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that group of seven unrelated investors can be aggregated), with Telxon,
67 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (refusing to aggregate multiple investors solely because of
their lack of relationship).
75. For a further discussion of the statutory interpretation of aggregation, see
infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
76. For a further discussion of the legislative history as applied to the permis-
sibility of aggregation, see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
77. For a further discussion of the impermissibility of a large number of inves-
tors serving as the lead plaintiff under the PSLRA, see infra notes 101-08 and ac-
companying text.
78. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 69 (stating premises to accept aggregation).
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than one investor to serve as the lead plaintiff.79 The lead plaintiff provi-
sion states that the court can appoint as lead plaintiff the "member or
members" of the class, and that the plaintiff be a "person or group of per-
sons."80 The PSLRA has therefore made clear that courts may appoint
more than one investor to serve as the lead plaintiff.8 1
As to the second and third determination, the statutory text is silent
over whether multiple investors must have a prior relationship to the liti-
gation and whether courts can aggregate their financial interests.8 2 De-
spite this silence, appointing unrelated investors as lead plaintiff does not
violate the lead plaintiff provision.8 3 The text requires only that the court
inquire into the adequacy of the group and not into the relationship of
the group's members.8 4 To determine, however, whether aggregating
multiple unrelated investors satisfies the adequacy requirement, the legis-
lative history offers support, and simply requires that the lead plaintiff ac-
tively represent the class and drive the litigation as opposed to the lead
counsel. 85 As a result, in certain instances, aggregating investors may sat-
isfy both of these conditions.86
For example, the Cendant case illustrates a situation in which the
court properly evaluated the group's adequacy in deciding whether the
group can be appointed as lead plaintiff.87 In determining whether the
group of three "unrelated" institutional investors could actively represent
the class and drive the litigation, the court properly considered, consistent
with the legislative history of the PSLRA, whether each member could ex-
ercise authority without interference by the other group members, moni-
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (providing textual support for allowing
more than one investor to serve as lead plaintiff).
80. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (i) & (iii) (emphasis added) (illustrating
that language of PSLRA allows more than one investor to serve as lead plaintiff).
81. See id. (recognizing explicit language to appoint multiple investors).
82. See id. (noting lack of explicit language as to second and third criteria).
83. For a further discussion of the permissibility of aggregation, see infra
notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
84. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (stating that court shall appoint plain-
tiff most capable of adequately representing interests of class members); see also In
re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266 (3d Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with those
courts that have held that PSLRA invariably precludes group of "unrelated individ-
uals" from serving as lead plaintiff). But see Fisch, supra note 8, at 69 ("It is a
mistake, however, to conclude that the appearance of the term ["group"] man-
dates, or even permits, the appointment of large groups of unrelated investors.");
Heck, supra note 29, at 1218 ("Permitting courts to aggregate the financial losses of
individual plaintiffs to determine what group has the largest financial interest in
the litigation is one way in which the congressional purpose of favoring institu-
tional investors can be frustrated.").
85. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 ("The
lead plaintiff should actively represent the class. The Committee believes that the
lead plaintiff-not lawyers-should drive the litigation.").
86. For a further discussion and analysis of the adequacy requirement, see
infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
87. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 262-68 (evaluating statutory structure and legisla-
tive history in appointing most adequate plaintiff).
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tor the lead counsel's decisions and work with rather than under the other
investors.88
Requiring the court to assess the adequacy and financial interests of
the group arguably burdens the judicial system. 8 9 Specifically, critics ar-
gue that by endorsing lead plaintiff groups, even those of reasonable size,
courts transform the appointment process from a relatively objective in-
quiry into a subjective inquiry subject to unwarranted judicial interven-
tion.90 The statutory text, however, imposes a duty on the court to
determine the adequacy of the lead plaintiff groups. 9 1 In particular, the
PSLRA states that the court will appoint as lead plaintiff the "members of
the purported class that the court determines to be most capable of ade-
quately representing the interests of the class members ...."92 Further,
the text states that the most adequate plaintiff "in the determination of the
court, has the largest financial interest .... -"3 Therefore, an independent
inquiry by the district court is not only consistent with the PSLRA, but also
required.9 4
It has been argued that a court appointment of multiple investors as
lead plaintiff may divide the decision-making among the members of the
group.95 Members may disagree over how the litigation should proceed,
resulting in an inefficient litigation.9 6 Courts will have to consider this
consequence when determining whether a group of investors is ade-
quate. 9 7 Again, if a court finds that group members can monitor and
drive the litigation without undue interference by other members, then
the court can appoint the group. 98 As illustrated in the Cendant case, the
court properly considered whether the group's size interfered or diluted
88. See id. (stating criteria evaluated in determining adequacy).
89. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 76-77 (stating that if "court actively evaluates the
composition of the lead plaintiff group, it initiates an arbitrary and wasteful pro-
cess") (citation omitted).
90. See id. at 76 (stating that aggregation "converts the selection of the lead
plaintiff from an objective process into an unwieldy and easily manipulated
procedure").
91. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) & (iii) (requiring court to determine
adequacy and financial interest of prospective plaintiff).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (1) (bb).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (recognizing that PSLRA requires active
role by court).
95. See Heck, supra note 29, at 1221 (stating that aggregated group divides
decision-making and "slow[s] litigation when they disagree on how to proceed");
see also Fisch, supra note 8, at 79 (stating that group of unrelated investors has "no
inherent decision making structure").
96. See Heck, supra note 29, at 1221 (discussing how coordination problems
among multiple investors may seriously effect litigation).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (stating that court determines
adequacy).
98. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (refer-
ring to requirements set forth in legislative history in determining group's
adequacy).
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the members' decision-making power and control over the litigation. 99
Because the court determined that aggregation would not dilute any mem-
ber's control, it properly appointed the group. 10 0
Not all situations, however, justify aggregating multiple unrelated in-
vestors. 10 1 In determining a group's adequacy, a court must also evaluate
whether the group has aggregated its members solely to attain the greatest
financial interest or whether the group legitimately and adequately can
serve the interests of the class. 10 2 As to the former inquiry, if a large num-
ber of investorsjoin together in order to attain the greatest financial inter-
est, then the court properly may refuse to appoint this type of group. 10 3
In this situation, a group comprising many individual investors with little
financial interest in the litigation may be inadequate to serve the class's
interests. 10 4 According to the legislative history, the members in this type
of group lack any incentive to participate in the litigation and monitor
counsel's decisions. 10 5 The legislative history of the PSLRA further indi-
cates that aggregating a large number of investors conflicts with the goal
of PSLRA, which is to increase control of the plaintiff over the litiga-
tion.10 6 By enacting the PSLRA, Congress sought to deter lawyers from
making personal decisions and negotiating settlement agreements without
consulting the plaintiffs. 10 7 In short, a large group restricts each mem-
ber's ability to monitor the litigation and serve the interests of the class.' 08
99. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (inquiring
into whether movant group was too large to represent class adequately).
100. See id. (stating that group could operate effectively as single unit).
101. For additional discussion of situations militating against aggregation, see
infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (requiring court to determine ade-
quacy of group); see also Fisch, supra note 8, at 74-75 (recognizing undesirability of
having massive lead plaintiff groups); Heck, supra note 29, at 1220-21 (same).
103. Cf S. REP. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (stat-
ing that lead plaintiff must be able to actively monitor counsel and litigation).
One commentator has stated that "[t]he efforts of some firms to create massive
lead plaintiff groups to secure the lead counsel appointment are not socially pro-
ductive." Fisch, supra note 8, at 75 (describing how aggregating financial interest
of investors for purposes of obtaining lead counsel appointment leads to inade-
quate monitoring and apathy by plaintiff).
104. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 71-72 (explaining that group with small individ-
ual stakes reduce likelihood that group members will participate actively in litiga-
tion process).
105. See id. (explaining that group with small individual stakes reduce likeli-
hood that group members will participate actively in litigation process).
106. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (stating
that purpose of PSLRA is to encourage lead plaintiff, not lawyers, to drive
litigation).
107. See id. at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (recognizing that Con-
gress sought to deter "lawyer-driven" litigation).
108. Cf id. at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (noting similarity be-
tween professional plaintiffs and large number of unrelated investors).
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B. The Third Circuit Correctly Interpreted the Lead Plaintiff Provision; the
Northern District of Ohio Misinterpreted the Provision
The Third Circuit in Cendant adopted the appropriate test of ade-
quacy, not relatedness, in deciding whether to appoint a group of inves-
tors as lead plaintiff.10 9 In that case, three unrelated institutional investors
demonstrated that they could represent the claims vigorously, select com-
petent counsel and monitor all decisions made on behalf of the class. 110
Even though the three investors were not related, the court applied the
correct test in determining whether the group could adequately protect
the interests of the class and monitor the litigation based on their financial
interest in the suit and bargaining power with counsel."1 I
The court in Telxon, however, misconstrued this test by refusing to
appoint a group of two unrelated members. 112 The court failed to con-
sider whether the members could vigorously represent the interests of the
class and monitor the litigation as a group. 1' 3 Rather, the court based its
decision solely on the fact that the members were unrelated. 1 4 As a re-
sult, the court improperly denied the group lead plaintiff
consideration.' 15
V. COURT-ORDERED AUCTIONS AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Court-ordered auctions emerged in 1990 as a means of selecting class
counsel among a pool of bidders. 116 When Congress enacted the PSLRA
in 1995, the question emerged whether court-ordered auctions were per-
109. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
appropriate test for appointing lead plaintiff).
110. See id. at 268-69 (stating group satisfied adequacy requirement).
111. See id. (holding that adequacy, not relationship, is issue).
112. See In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 823 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (holding that lack of relationship barred group from serving as lead
plaintiff).
113. See id. at 815-28 (neglecting to assess adequacy of investors).
114. See id. at 823 (identifying relationship of proposed group members as
crucial criteria).
115. See id. at 828 (denying appointment of plaintiff group).
116. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (estab-
lishing first court-ordered auction in country). In Oracle, two law firms argued over
which group of lawyers would be designated class counsel. See HOOPER & LEARV,
supra note 10, at 15 (quoting Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Coun-
sel, Reporters Transcript of Proceedings, Judge Vaughn Walker at 38 (Mar. 16,
2001)). One of the attorneys approached Judge Walker of the Northern District of
New York and told him "don't worry about the case. We've got the whole thing
worked out." See id. (quoting Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Coun-
sel at 38-39). Judge Walker of the Northern District of California interpreted the
parties' conduct to mean that the arrangement "'was at the lawyer's benefit and
not at the benefit of the class.'" See id. (quoting Third Circuit Task Force on Selec-
tion of Class Counsel at 39). As a result, the court ordered an auction, reasoning
that "[t] hat process most closely approximates the way class members would make
these decisions and should result in selection of the most appropriately qualified
counsel at the best available price." Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 690.
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missible under the terms of the lead counsel provision. 117 Currently,
courts disagree over whether they can auction the position of lead counsel
or whether the PSLRA requires that they defer to the lead plaintiff's
choice of counsel. 1 18
A. Court-Ordered Auctions
A court-ordered auction is a court's request to each lawyer to submit a
bid proposing fees and expenses to litigate the -class action.1 19 Among
those courts that have ordered auction, bidders typically have submitted
either to the court or to the plaintiff qualitative and quantitative informa-
tion, which typically have included the bidder's qualifications, prior exper-
117. For a discussion and analysis of the permissibility of auctions under the
PSLRA, see infra notes 184-239 and accompanying text.
118. Compare In re Network Assocs. Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-
34 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (employing auction) and In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig.,
168 F.R.D. 257, 259 (N.D. Cal 1996) (same), with In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,
264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that auctions are impermissible as mat-
ter of first resort), and In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to conduct auction because plaintiff was able to conduct
negotiation with counsel).
119. See HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 2-3 (defining auction process).
The purpose of the auction originally was to find a more objective way to award
attorneys' fees without relying on the standard percentages routinely awarded in
class actions. See id. (setting forth objectives of court-ordered auctions).
Courts primarily have used two methods of awarding attorneys fees, the lode-
star method and the percentage of recovery method. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 12,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 691 (describing fee calculation methods).
Under the lodestar method, a court multiplies the number of hours by a reasona-
ble hourly fee, which may be increased by an additional amount based on risk or
other relevant factors. See id. (stating one method in which courts currently award
attorney's fees). The court may opt to adjust that figure, the lodestar, by applying
a multiplier either upward or downward. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (recognizing purpose of multi-
plier). The United States Supreme Court presumed that the lodestar figure, the
product of reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate, represents a "reason-
able" fee. See id. (exploring consistency associated with fee-shifting). Factors such
as novelty and complexity of the issues, special skill and experience of counsel, the
quality of representation, and the results obtained from the litigation are reflected
in the lodestar amount. See id. (noting that upward adjustment of lodestar is rare
because these factors are not considered in multiplier).
Under the percentage-of-recovery method, the court awards attorneys' fees as
a certain percentage of the settlement. See HOOPER & LFvRV, supra note 10, at 1-2
(describing alternative method of awarding attorneys' fees in securities class ac-
tions); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (con-
cluding that percentage of recovery approach in common fund cases is better
practice than lodestar approach). The court found that the attorney's fee award
ranges about 30% of the fund in nearly all common fund cases, absent extraordi-
nary circumstances. See id. at 1377 (accounting for range of attorney fees in aver-
age cases). As a result, the court set a percentage of recovery approach at thirty
percent. See id. at 1378 (rejecting lodestar approach as method of calculating at-
torney fees).
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iences and fees. 120 Courts have evaluated these bids ex ante, at the
beginning of the litigation, to determine which prospective counsel is the
most qualified at the lowest price. 12 1
Since 1990 courts have ordered auctions in three pre-PSLRA and nine
post-PSLRA securities class actions.1 2 2 In ten of these class actions, the
court itself evaluated the bids and conducted the auction.' 23 In the other
two class actions, the court ordered the lead plaintiff to evaluate the bids
and conduct the auction. 124
120. See HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 29-31 (analyzing qualitative guide-
lines requested by Judge Walker, Judge Shadur and Judge Alsup). Judge Walker
required that bidders seeking lead counsel status submit information on the firm's
qualifications, including detailed descriptions of other class actions in which the
firm was involved. See id. (citing Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697)). In Wenderhold v. Cylink
Corp., the court requested each bidder to submit:
[T]itle, court, docket number, and date field for each securities class ac-
tion in which the bidder served as sole class counsel during the past three
years; the amount of recovery obtained on behalf of the class; the per-
centage of securities in the class for which claims were submitted; the
amount of recovery (if any) distributed to the class, and total amounts
received by the bidder, including fees and costs (if any).
Id. at 30 (citing Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587-88 (N.D. Cal.
1999)).
121. See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1193
(N.D. Il. 1996) (advocating use of auctions as less expenditure of time); HOOPER
& LEARY, supra note 10, at 18 (stating that 'judges who advocate auctioning suggest
that there is less expenditure ofjudicial time, compared to an ex post review of fee
petitions required under other methods").
122. See In reCommtouch Software Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 01-C-00719 (N.D. Cal.
June 27, 2001) (conducting post-PSLRA auction), cited in HOOPER & LEARY, supra
note 10, at 3 n.17; In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482-88 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(approving post-PSRLA auction under limited circumstances); Network, 76 F. Supp.
2d at 1033 (same); Wenderhold, 188 F.R.D. at 587 (ordering post-PSRLA auction);
Cal. Micro Devices, 168 F.R.D. at 259 (ordering pre-PSLRA auction); In re Wells
Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same); In re Oracle Sec.
Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (same); In re Lucent Techs. Inc. Sec.
Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J. 2000) (same); In re Cendant Corp. Litig. 182
F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998) (ordering auction), vacated by, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir.
2001); In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (N.D. Il1. 2001) (approv-
ing use of auction); In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780,
784 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (analyzing competing bids); Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v.
Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 694 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
123. See Quintus, 201 F.R.D. at 482-88 (holding that court will conduct auction
rather than ordering plaintiff to conduct auction); Wenderhold, 188 F.R.D. at 587
(same); Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697 (same); Cal. Micro Devices, 168 F.R.D. at 259
(same); Wells Fargo, 157 F.R.D. at 468 (same); Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 154 (same);
Cendant, 182 F.R.D. at 151 (same); Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 694 (same); Com-
disco, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (same); Bank One S'Holders, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D.
I1. 2000) (same).
124. See Commtouch, No. 01-C-00719 (holding that plaintiff rather than court
will conduct auction), cited in HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 3 n.17; Network, 76
F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (same).
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Supporters of court-ordered auctions have advanced several argu-
ments in favor of their use.' 2 5 According to one of the arguments, auc-
tions allow smaller firms to bid lower fees and obtain lead counsel
appointment when they otherwise would not be able to do so. 126 Another
argument advanced is that auctions, as a competitive process, lower attor-
neys' fees and therefore increase the amount distributed, or damage re-
covery, to the class. 12 7
Critics of court-ordered auctions argue that large individual investors
or institutional investors already engage in a practice known as "legal
beauty contests" in which the client seeks prospective attorneys and re-
quests their proposals as to how they would handle the matter.1 28 The
investor then compares each lawyer's expertise and understanding of the
risks involved in the class action. 129 According to the critics, by engaging
in this practice, investors adequately assess a fee structure that takes into
account both the price and the quality of services. 130
125. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 38-39 (listing bene-
fits of auction method). The Third Circuit Task Force listed the following benefits
of auctions: (1) benefits to the class from attorney fees-percentage of recovery
awarded to counsel in auction cases is often less than that awarded by traditional
methods; (2) judicial economy-the judges who have used auctioning contend
that there is less expenditure of judicial resources, compared to the ex post assess-
ments of attorney fees required for fee awards in cases of traditional appointment;
(3) eliminates "race to the courthouse"; (4) Ex ante Fee Determination; and (5)
competition-auctions provide a market test for cost of lawyer's services because
there is a competition among firms. See id. at 38-39 (listing arguments in favor of
auctions).
Among those judges that have auctioned the position of lead counsel, they
generally advance five reasons in favor of auctions: (1) replicating the marketplace
for legal services and reducing attorneys' fees, (2) improving attorney-proposed
case representation, (3) giving the class the benefit of the low risk of nonrecovery,
(4) reducing the expenditure of judicial time and (5) compensating for the pres-
ence of an inadequate or uninterested plaintiff. See HOOPER & LEARV, supra note
10, at 15 (explaining courts' rationales for conducting auctions).
126. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 38-41 (stating that
auctions increase pool of attorneys because all lawyers are vying for position of
lead counsel).
127. See id. (stating difference in awards to attorneys under auction approach,
lodestar approach and percentage of recovery approach).
128. Id. at app. B, at 4 (statement by Grant & Eisenhofer) (describing beauty
contest as process routinely employed by institutional investors); see Symposium,
The Law and Economics of Lawyering: Second Opinion in Litigation, 84 VA. L. REv. 1411,
1427-28 (1998) (explaining that legal beauty contest occurs when client initially
selects lawyer to take case, which affords attorney opportunity to compare initial
advice of several lawyers with present situation and to assess lawyers' expertise and
predisposition toward risk).
129. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, app. B, at 4-5 (state-
ment by Grant & Eisenhofer) (obtaining assessment of problem from various attor-
neys to get better perspective of risk and also to decide which attorney offers
higher quality legal assistance at better price).
130. See id. (recognizing that institutional investors already seek advice and
assess quality).
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Critics also argue that auctions undermine one of the purposes of the
PSLRA, which is to increase plaintiff activism in selecting their own coun-
sel. 131 They further argue that auctions sacrifice quality of representation
with cheaper and less experienced attorneys. 132 Last, they argue that auc-
tions prevent courts from acting impartially during the litigation because
they become engaged as "auctioneers."133
Based on these criticisms, an issue has arisen whether a court should
defer to the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel under a standard of review
similar to the business judgment rule and therefore not second-guess the
plaintiffs judgment.' 3 4 Those in favor of this standard of review argue
that the statutory text and the legislative history require deference; those
against it argue that auctions provide an important means to lower attor-
ney's fees while allowing a significant recovery to the class.' 3 5 In order to
understand how the business judgment rule applies, it is important to un-
derstand what the doctrine represents. 13
6
131. See id. at 56 (stating that auctions have risk of discouraging prospective
lead plaintiff because they are deprived of their choice of counsel and it interferes
with their ability to take active and meaningful role in class action).
132. See id. at 46 (stating risk that low fee will lead to low quality representa-
tion). The Task Force Report notes:
The auction method could encourage firms to submit unduly low bids in
order to win the position of class counsel. Underbidding can result in
lawyers cutting corners or settling too early in order to maintain a profit
margin. Where the winning firm's bid is too low - as it will often be due
to the pressures of competitive bidding and the imperfect information
available at the time of the auction - the firm will have a conflict of inter-
est. Its own interest in securing reasonable compensation for time spent
would be in conflict with its duty to prosecute the case with vigor and
dedication to maximize the class recovery.
Id. (citation omitted).
133. See id. at 57 (discussing risk of compromising judicial impartiality); see
also Fisch, supra note 8, at 95 ("By casting the court as auctioneer and referee, lead
counsel auctions also threaten the court's neutrality.").
134. Compare Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 88 (recom-
mending that "scrutiny akin to the business judgment rule" should be applied to
lead plaintiff's choice of counsel and to fee arrangements), id. app. B, at 5 (state-
ment by Stuart M. Grant &Jay W. Eisenhofer) ("The court should review the lead
plaintiffs choice of counsel applying the tenets of the business judgment rule."),
and id. app. B, at 5-6 (statement by Keith Johnson) (stating courts must defer to
counsel selection decisions made by plaintiffs under business judgment rule), with
In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(finding auction appropriate rather than deferring to lead plaintiffs choice of
counsel), and In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-34
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (same).
135. For a further discussion of the disagreement among courts in deciding
whether to defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, see infra notes 144-79 and
accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see infra notes 137-43
and accompanying text.
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B. Background of the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule developed over a century and a half ago
as the primary means by which courts review business decisions by corpo-
rate directors.13 7 Under this rule, courts presume that in making a busi-
ness decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and with an honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interest of the company.138 In order to state a claim, therefore, a share-
holder plaintiff has a "heavy burden" of pleading and proving facts to over-
come this presumption.' 39 If the party challenging the board's decision
does establish facts sufficient to overcome the presumption, the court will
examine the decision-making process of the board member.' 40 If the
court finds that the board member approved a transaction without being
informed and without a good faith or honest belief that the transaction
was in the best interest of the corporation, then the business judgment
rule is inapplicable and the court will scrutinize the fairness of the transac-
tion to the shareholders.14
In determining whether the business judgment rule applies in a
PSLRA case, courts, commentators and the Third Circuit Task Force disa-
gree over the proper interpretation of the lead counsel provision. 14 2 In
137. See DENNISJ. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY Du-
TIES OF CORPORATE DIRCTORS 4-5 (1993) (stating historical background to busi-
ness judgment rule); see also Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Pimer on the
Basics of Directors'Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part I), 40 VILL. L. REV.
1297, 1302-03 (1995) (recognizing that business judgment rule was developed to
give board of directors "significant protection and discretion in making business
decisions").
138. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (stat-
ing standard of review under business judgment rule that court applies to direc-
tor's business decision); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985) (same); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (same);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (same); see also EISENBERG, supra
note 15, at 545 (stating conditions of business judgment review to apply to direc-
tor's decision).
139. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 137, at 14 (stating heavy burden on plaintiff
to overcome business judgment rule) (citing Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764,
768 (2d Cir. 1980)).
140. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Due care in the
decisionmaking context is process due care only.").
141. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 137, at 15 (stating that fairness is standard of
review if presumption under business judgment rule is defeated); see also Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (stating that entire fairness
standard applies if presumption overcome); EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 545 (stat-
ing that if conditions of business judgment rule are not satisfied, then standard by
which quality of decision is reviewed is entire fairness or reasonability).
142. Compare In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding district court erred by conducting auction without reviewing plaintiff's
choice of counsel), and In re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D.
475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating court should not substitute its judgement for
that of lead plaintiff if lead plaintiff adequately negotiated with counsel), with In re
Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (stating
25
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particular, they disagree over whether the provision permits a deferential
standard of review of the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel. 143
VI. SUMMARY OF COURT AND TASK FORCE ANALYSES OF AUCTIONS
Courts and the Third Circuit Task Force disagree over whether they
must defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel. 144 Those courts that
have deferred to the lead plaintiff's choice have argued that auctions are
inappropriate as a matter of first choice. 1 45 The Third Circuit Task Force
found that a court likewise should defer to the plaintiff's choice of coun-
sel, but under a standard of review similar to the business judgment
rule. 1 4
6
A. Courts that Defer to the Lead Plaintiffs Choice of Counsel
The Third Circuit, the Southern District of New York and the North-
ern District of California have interpreted the lead counsel provision to
mean that courts should defer to the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel if
that choice resulted from a good faith selection and meaningful arms-
length bargaining. 14 7 Those courts have urged that they should not evalu-
ate whether they believe the lead plaintiff could have made a better choice
or received a better deal. 148
that court would be remiss if it did not auction lead counsel position to obtain
potentially lower fee for class members).
The Third Circuit Task Force and some commentators have found that a stan-
dard of review similar to the business judgment review is appropriate. See Third
Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87-88 (stating that "scrutiny akin to
business judgment rule" is appropriate); id. app. B, at 5 (statement of Grant &
Eisenhofer) (stating that review under business judgment rule is appropriate); id.
app. B, at 5-6 (stating of Keith Johnson) (same).
143. For a further discussion of the court analyses of appropriate standard of
review given to lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, see infra notes 144-79 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of the Task Force's analysis of appropriate
standard of review given to lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, see infra notes 180-83
and accompanying text.
144. For a further discussion of the court and Task Force's analyses of the
auction process, see infra notes 144-83 and accompanying text.
145. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 274-75 (finding that if plaintiff has employed
reasonable decision-making process in selecting counsel, it is inappropriate to con-
duct auction); Quintus, 201 F.R.D. at 482 (same).
146. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87-88 (stating busi-
ness judgment rule is appropriate standard of review).
147. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 274 (stating that "court should generally employ
a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiffs choices"); Copper Mountain,
201 F.R.D. at 486 (stating that plaintiff's choice of counsel should not be disturbed
when plaintiff adequately negotiates with counsel and obtains superior fee
agreement).
148. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 286 (stating that ultimate inquiry is always
whether lead plaintiff's choices were arrived at via meaningful arms-length bar-
gaining); Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 489 (stating that if fee arrangement dem-
onstrates adequate negotiation then court will not disturb this decision); In re
Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that
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For instance, in Cendant, the Third Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion in conducting an auction. 149 In that case, the lead
plaintiff negotiated a retainer agreement with counsel before litigating its
claim. 150 The district court did not evaluate whether the retainer agree-
ment was agreed upon at arms-length and in good faith but, instead, or-
dered an auction. 15 1 An investor of the corporation appealed the district
court's decision in conducting the auction and argued that the fee the
court accepted was actually $76 million more than the price agreed upon
in the retainer agreement.' 52 The Third Circuit found that the auction
was improper and inconsistent with the terms of the lead counsel provi-
sion of the PSLRA.' 53 The court reasoned that the PSLRA restricts the
court's role to approving the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel.' 54 Further,
the Third Circuit reasoned that the district court failed to evaluate the
parties' decision-making process in negotiating the retainer agreement
and to determine whether the agreement was at arms-length. 155
Both the Northern District of California in In re Copper Mountain Net-
work Securities Litigation'5 6 and the Southern District of New York in
Razorfish have followed a line of reasoning similar to that of the Third
Circuit. 1 57 Both courts rejected the use of an auction and agreed that if
the lead plaintiff negotiates a reasonable fee with counsel, then the court
must defer to the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel.158 By deferring to the
court will not conduct auction when plaintiff is able to conduct negotiation with
other counsel).
149. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 278-83 (finding that district court failed to review
lead plaintiffs decision-making process in selecting counsel).
150. See id. at 224 (stating facts).
151. See id. at 276 (stating facts).
152. See id. at 220 (stating facts). The counsel obtained by the lead plaintiff
pursuant to the retainer was the same counsel appointed to the case under the
auction. See id. (stating facts).
153. See id. at 273 (stating holding).
154. See id. at 273 (stating facts).
155. See id. at 276 (stating facts).
156. 201 F.R.D. 475, 487 (N.D. Cal. 2001). For purposes of this Comment, In
re Copper Mountain Networks Securities Litigation and In re Quintus Securities Litigation
will be treated as two separate cases even though the court addressed both cases in
one opinion.
157. See In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding, similar to Third Circuit, that auction is inappropriate when plain-
tiff is able to negotiate reasonable fee with counsel); In re Copper Mountain Net-
works Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 487 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding, similar to Third
Circuit, that it would not conduct auction because investor negotiated fee agree-
ment that appeared reasonable).
158. See Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 487 (stating that court is willing to
defer to plaintiff's choice where reasonable fee is negotiated); cf Razorfish, 143 F.
Supp. 2d at 310-11 (finding auction was inappropriate and that under PSLRA pri-
mary focus should not be on selection of counsel).
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lead plaintiff's choice, those courts will not substitute their judgment for
that of the lead plaintiff if the fee arrangement is reasonable. 159
Additionally, the court in Razorfish found that even if the lead plain-
tiff's first choice of counsel is inadequate, the court should allow the plain-
tiff to select another lead counsel as opposed to ordering an auction. 16 °
In that case, the court refused to conduct an auction after it rejected lead
plaintiffs first choice of counsel. 16' The court concluded that the text of
the lead counsel provision does not give a court the right to arrange a
"shot-gun marriage between strangers" even if it disapproves of the lead
plaintiff's choice of counsel.1 62 According to the court, such an intrusive
measure is inconsistent with the PSLRA, which requires that the lead
plaintiff select and retain counsel. 163
As a result, the Third Circuit, the Northern District of California and
the Southern District of New York have found that a court should defer to
the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel if the agreement of the group mem-
ber was a product of reasonable negotiation and arms-length bargain-
ing.' 64 According to these courts, auctions are impermissible when such
factors are present. 16 5
B. Courts Permitting Auctions
Nine post-enactment PSLRA cases have permitted auctions. 166 In
those cases, however, the courts advanced three different situations in
159. See Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that lead plaintiff should
exercise conduct of litigation); Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 489 (stating that
court will not disturb plaintiff's decision).
160. See Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (refusing to auction lead counsel
position as matter of first choice).
161. See id. (stating facts).
162. See id. (discussing conclusion).
163. See id. (discussing role of lead plaintiff in choice of counsel).
164. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
that "court should generally employ a deferential standard in reviewing the lead
plaintiff's choices"); Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 487 (noting that court is willing
to defer to plaintiff's choice where reasonable fee is negotiated); cf. Razorfish, 143
F. Supp. 2d at 310 (stating that presumptive lead plaintiff is plaintiff with biggest
stake in litigation who then selects lead counsel).
165. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 276 (stating that auction is impermissible
when fee arrangement between plaintiff and counsel resulted from good faith se-
lection and negotiation process and arrived from meaningful arms-length bargain-
ing); Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (refusing to conduct auction even though it
refused to appoint lead plaintiff's choice of counsel); Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D.
at 489 (stating that auction is inappropriate when plaintiff and counsel negotiated
reasonable fee agreement).
166. See In reComdisco Sec. Litig., 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (order-
ing auction); In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784-85
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); In re Commtouch Software Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 01-C-00719,
(N.D. Cal. June 27, 2001) (ordering lead plaintiff to conduct auction), cited in
HOPPER & LEARV, supra note 10, at 3 n.17; In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475,
482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (ordering auction when court determined that plaintiff una-
ble to negotiate reasonable fee agreement with counsel); In re Network Assocs. Inc.
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which an auction is permissible: (1) when the court has not yet appointed
the lead plaintiff; (2) when all prospective plaintiffs are unable or incapa-
ble of negotiating a competitive fee arrangement with any class counsel,
but the class action is well-suited to proceed; and (3) when the lead plain-
tiff's choice of counsel is unable to serve as lead counsel.
167
Illustrating the first situation, the Northern District of California in In
re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions1 68 ordered an auction before ap-
pointing the lead plaintiff.169 According to the court, it had a duty to
choose a lead counsel at a reasonable price, and an auction typically pro-
vides a lower fee for counsel than a plaintiffs negotiated fee. 170 The court
continued by noting that if the auction resulted in counsel who requested
a lower fee than that requested by a presumptive plaintiffs counsel, the
plaintiff would be required to accept representation by the lowest bid-
der. 7 1 Otherwise, the court would select the next presumptive lead
plaintiff.172
Illustrating the second situation, the Northern District of California in
In re Quintus Securities Litigation1 73 ordered an auction because the pre-
Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering plaintiff rather
than court to conduct auction); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587-
88 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering auction); In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168
F.R.D. 257, 270-71 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding PSLRA permits auctions); In re Lu-
cent Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 156-58 (D.N.J. 2000) (same); In re
Cendant Corp. Litig. 182 F.R.D. 144, 151 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding auctions permissi-
ble as matter of first resort rather than deferring to lead plaintiff's choice of coun-
sel), vacated by, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001); Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-
Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (ordering auction).
167. See Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 491 (holding that auctions are appro-
priate only when plaintiff is incapable of negotiating reasonable fee agreement
and all other prospective plaintiffs are inadequate to serve as lead plaintiff); Bank
One S'Holders, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (holding that auctions were appropriate as
matter of first resort); Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (holding that auc-
tion was appropriate because lead counsel was unable to serve in litigation).
168. 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. I11. 2000).
169. See Bank One S'Holders, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (requiring that presumptive
lead plaintiff accept most qualified bidder as counsel). In Bank One S'Holders, the
court held a bid among law firms before appointing the lead plaintiff. See id. (stat-
ing facts of case). The court held that if the presumptive lead plaintiff were to
insist on their class counsel handling the action on a hypothesized materially less
favorable contractual basis, this insistence would effectively rebut the presumption
that the putative class representatives were the most adequate plaintiffs. See id.
(stating conclusion). The court suggests, however, that if "the presumptive class
representative was willing to be represented by the most favorable qualified bidder
among the lawyers submitting bids, with that bidder either supplanting the pre-
sumptive lead plaintiffs original choice of counsel or working together with that
original counsel," the presumptive "most adequate" plaintiff would be appointed
as lead plaintiff. See id. (describing process for determining lead plaintiff when
auction is employed).
170. See id. (arguing in favor of ordering auction).
171. See id. at 783-84 (stating factors in choosing lead counsel).
172. See id. at 784 (stating means for selecting next plaintiff).
173. 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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sumptive lead plaintiff was unwilling to negotiate a reasonable fee agree-
ment with counsel, and all other prospective plaintiffs were inadequate to
serve as lead plaintiff.174 Because the class action appeared well-suited to
proceed, the court appointed the presumptive lead plaintiff to the litiga-
tion but auctioned the lead counsel position to ensure class representation
at a reasonable price.1 75
With respect to the final situation, in In re Network Associates, Inc. Securi-
ties Litigation,176 the Northern District of California ordered an auction
when the lead plaintiffs first choice of counsel was unable to serve as lead
counsel.' 77 The court ordered the lead plaintiff, rather than the court, to
conduct the auction. 178 The court reasoned that because the lead plain-
tiff owes the class a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest quality representa-
tion at the lowest price, it should be the plaintiff, not the court, who
conducts the auction. 1
79
C. Task Force Findings
Recently, the Third Circuit appointed a Task Force, composed of
judges, scholars and practicing attorneys, to evaluate the appropriate
method for selecting class counsel and to determine whether court-or-
dered auctions are permitted under the PSLRA lead counsel provision. 180
The Task Force released its preliminary findings in which it concluded
that a court should defer to the plaintiffs choice of counsel under a stan-
dard of review similar to the business judgment rule.' 8 ' The Task Force
174. See In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. at 481 (stating facts of case).
175. See id. (describing formalities of auction).
176. 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
177. See Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (stating facts).
178. See id. (stating facts). In ordering the plaintiff to conduct the auction,
the court required the lead plaintiff to publicize a request for written proposals
from counsel, evaluate all of the proposals received and interview any candidates
deemed appropriate. See id. at 1033-34 (stating facts). The lead plaintiff was then
ordered to submit his recommendations for his first and second choices as class
counsel, including a full description of his selection process, his conclusions and
his reasons. See id. (stating facts).
179. See id. (discussing rationale for plaintiff to conduct auction).
180. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 14 (stating pur-
pose of convening Task Force). On January 30, 2001, Chief Judge Edward R.
Becker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit convened this
Third Circuit Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel to "evaluate the emerg-
ing practice of several district court judges throughout the country of selecting
class counsel and setting fees through [an] auction process." See id. at I (stating
background). The primary duty of the Task Force was to assess the propriety and
efficacy of the use of the auction method in its various applications, and to formu-
late recommendations for the bench, bar and public. See Press Release, ThirdJudi-
cial Circuit, Creation of Task Force (Jan. 30, 2001) (on file with Villanova Law
Review), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/taskforce.pdf (stat-
ing goals in press release that task force sought to evaluate).
181. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87-93 (concluding
that deferential standard of review must be applied to most adequate plaintiff's
choice of counsel). The Task Force made several important recommendations in
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concluded that "once the court has identified the most adequate plaintiff
under the terms of the Act, that party's choice of counsel should be re-
viewed with the deference given to any other business decision."' 8 2 There-
fore, the Task Force recommended that "scrutiny akin to the business
judgment rule" should be applied to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel
and to the fee arrangements if that decision was independent and
careful.' 8 3
concluding that auctions are generally disfavored under the PSLRA. See id. at 17-
18 (listing recommendations). First, the Task Force concluded that auctions are
inconsistent with the goal of the PSLRA, which is to assure that the "most ade-
quate" plaintiff chooses counsel and negotiates a reasonable fee. See id. at 18 (rec-
ommending that courts not employ auctions). The PSLRA, according to the Task
Force, mandates that "class actions are to be client-driven, not court-driven." Id.
In adopting the business judgment rule as the appropriate standard of review, the
Task Force found that:
To the extent that an auction is even permissible under the PSLRA, it
should only be conducted if the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, or pro-
cess in choosing counsel, is so infirm as to rebut the presumption that the
plaintiff is "most adequate" under the statute, and then only if the alter-
native candidates for the "most adequate plaintiff' do not appear willing
or able to engage in a meaningful search for and negotiation with
counsel.
Id.
The Task Force also disputes the contention that auctions do not require an
ex post determination of fees at the end of the litigation. See id. (finding that auc-
tion requires both ex ante and ex post determinations). According to the Task
Force, Rule 23 ultimately requires the court to examine the fairness of the fees
requested by counsel at the conclusion of the case. See id. at 19 (noting judge's
obligations).
182. Id. at 87.
183. See id. at 88 (noting that courts should not second-guess lead plaintiff's
choice of counsel if it is result of careful and independent process). In determin-
ing whether the decision-making process was independent and reasonable, the
Task Force referred to a five-factor test outlined by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in its brief submitted to the Third Circuit in Cendant. See id. at 89-90
(stating method to determine whether decision was independent and reasonable).
According to this test, the lead plaintiff should: (1) follow procedures to identify a
reasonable number of counsel with the skill and ability necessary to represent the
class in the pending matter, (2) demonstrate the procedures used in inviting com-
petent counsel to compete for the right to represent the class, (3) negotiate a fee
and expense reimbursement arrangement that promotes the best interests of the
class, (4) reasonably conclude that it has canvassed and actively negotiated with a
sufficient number of counsel and obtained the counsel that is likely to obtain the
highest net recovery to the class and (5) ensure that the counsel would not ad-
versely affect the exercise of the plaintiff's or counsel's fiduciary obligations to the
class. See id. at 87-93 (listing five-factor test in assessing decision-making process for
lead plaintiff) (citing Brief for Appellant at 3-5, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d
201 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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VII. ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
COURT-ORDERED AUCTIONS
Courts should defer to the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel under the
business judgment rule.18 4 The statutory text and the legislative history of
the lead counsel provision support this finding. 185 As a matter of public
policy, deference is appropriate because it encourages institutional inves-
tors to serve as lead plaintiff.
1 86
A. Auctions Are Impermissible As a Matter of First Choice Among Courts
Under the statutory text of the PSLRA, auctions are impermissible as
a matter of first choice among courts. 187 The text explicitly provides that
the lead plaintiff, not the court, has the right to select and retain class
counsel. 188 Auctions interfere with their right to select counsel. 18 9 Auc-
tions, instead, vest the court, not the lead plaintiff, with the authority to
select lead counsel. 190 In no manner does the PSLRA permit a court to
remove the plaintiff's ability to select and retain counsel. 9 '
184. For a further discussion on the business judgment rule as the appropri-
ate standard of review, see infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
185. For a further discussion of statutory language and legislative history sup-
porting the business judgment rule standard of review, see infra notes 187-209 and
accompanying text.
186. For a further discussion of the public policy supporting the business
judgment rule as the appropriate standard of review, see infra notes 210-14 and
accompanying text.
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (stating that most adequate plaintiff
must have largest financial interest and therefore must be most capable of select-
ing adequate counsel); id. at § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v) (stating that lead counsel provi-
sion vests lead plaintiff with authority to select and retain counsel). Commentators
have argued that the statutory text vests the plaintiff with the authority to select
lead counsel. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 91 ("The statutory text clearly vests the
plaintiff, not the court, with the authority to select lead counsel.... [T]he statute
provides no basis for the court to override the plaintiffs selection and to impose its
choice of counsel . . . with respect to such selection."). As a matter of policy, the
courts are poorly suited to make business decisions. See id. at 94 (stating that selec-
tion of counsel is business decision and courts are inadequate forum to make such
business decision). The Third Circuit Task Force found that the business judg-
ment rule provides sufficient flexibility in its application and that courts will de-
velop a framework for review that will provide appropriate deference to lead
plaintiffs. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87 (refuting com-
mentator's opinion that business judgment rule is too strong of standard to apply).
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v) (stating that lead plaintiff selects and
retains class counsel).
189. See generally, HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 3 (recognizing that court
develops guidelines of bidding procedures and requirements and selects winning
bidder); Fisch, supra note 8, at 92 ("Lead plaintiff auctions interfere with the statu-
tory objective of client empowerment .... ).
190. See HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 29-34 (stating procedures courts
employed in selecting lead counsel); Fisch, supra note 8, at 91-92 (stating conse-
quence of court-ordered auctions in lead counsel selection).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (recognizing no provision under the
PSLRA that allows court to select lead counsel).
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Further, the court already has appointed a lead plaintiff whom it
should have determined is capable of selecting class counsel. 19 2 Under
the text of the PSLRA, the court must appoint the lead plaintiff who can
adequately represent the class and has the largest financial stake in the
litigation.1 93 As already indicated, adequacy means that the plaintiff is em-
powered with the ability to select class counsel and monitor the counsel's
decisions. 194 Further, by stipulating that the lead plaintiff must have the
largest financial interest in the litigation, the PSLRA seeks a plaintiff who
would have the resources and the incentive to choose capable counsel,
monitor class counsel's performance and negotiate a reasonable fee. 195
It has been argued that auctions may reduce counsel's fees and there-
fore potentially increase the damage recovery to the injured class.1 96 This
argument, however, has two problems. 19 7 First and foremost, the issue is
not whether auctions are an alternate means for determining counsel fees,
but rather, whether they are permitted after the adoption of the
PSLRA. 198 As indicated, the PSLRA does not permit auctions. 19 9 Second,
auctions do not guarantee that counsel's fees in fact will be reduced.20 0
To illustrate, in Cendant, the district court approved class counsel's bid
that was higher in price as a result of the auction than originally was stipu-
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i), (iii) (stating that court appoints most
adequate plaintiff). For a further discussion on the requirements for selecting the
lead plaintiff, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (a) (3) (B) (iii) (stating requirements of lead plaintiff
provision).
194. For a further discussion on the adequacy requirement under the lead
plaintiff provision, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
195. Cf S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (stat-
ing Congress' belief that court should appoint plaintiff with largest financial inter-
est and that plaintiff should select lead counsel). For a further discussion on the
legislative history in having the plaintiff with the largest financial interest ap-
pointed as the lead plaintiff, see infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
196. See Comments on Class Counsel, Vaughn R. Walker, Comment on the
Draft Report of Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel 17 (Dec. 3,
2001) (on file with Villanova Law Review), available at, http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/comments/Walker-statement/pdf (stating that
"bidding securities cases recovered a significantly greater proportion of the poten-
tial for damage recovery than average"). In fact, one study revealed that "the bid-
ding cases recovered 19.6% of potential investor losses while the average of all
comparable cases was only 4.25%." Id.
197. For a further discussion on the problems associated with auctions, see
infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
198. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (iii) (stating whether PSLRA permits auc-
tions after being adopted in 1995); Fisch, supra note 8, at 91 ("[T]here are serious
reasons to question whether courts have authority under the PSLRA to employ an
auction to select lead counsel.").
199. For a discussion of the impermissibility of auctions under the PSLRA, see
supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
200. For a further discussion why auctions may not increase damage recovery
to the class, see infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
2002]
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lated in the retainer agreement. 20 1 As a result, the class received a lower
amount of damage recovery due to the auction. 20 2
The legislative history further supports the argument that auctions
are impermissible as a matter of first choice among courts. 20 3 It demon-
strates that Congress wanted securities class actions to be more plaintiff-
centered with the plaintiff, not the court, choosing the class counsel. 20 4
As a result, Congress entrusted the court to appoint the lead plaintiff who
can make informed decisions in selecting lead counsel. 20 5 Further, by re-
quiring that the lead plaintiff have the largest financial interest in the liti-
gation, Congress sought institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff.20 6
Again, institutional investors have a significant financial stake in the litiga-
tion and therefore have the incentive to seek class counsel who will obtain
the highest return.2 0 7 Further, they already engage in a lengthy selection
process, called "legal beauty contests," to assess the expertise and cost of a
number of lawyers before selecting counsel. 20 8 As a result, large investors
have the resources and the ability to properly select and retain class
counsel. 209
201. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
facts).
202. See id. (recognizing that auction resulted in less damages received to
class).
203. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8-11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687-90
(stating that Conference Committee recognized that problem in class actions was
that plaintiff investors lacked control in litigation).
204. Cf id. (recognizing that PSLRA sought to increase client-driven litigation
and prevent lawyer-driven litigation, but did not mention anything about court-
driven litigation). Commentators and the Third Circuit Task Force agree that the
PSLRA rejects the court-centered auctions in favor of empowering the lead plain-
tiff to select lead counsel. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 95 (stating that PSLRA reduces
court's supervisory role in favor of client empowerment structure); Third Circuit
Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 18 ("The PSLRA mandates that class actions
are to be client-driven, not court-driven.").
205. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690("[T]he Committee permits the lead plaintiff to choose the class counsel. This
provision is intended to permit the plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have
counsel choose the plaintiff.").
206. See id. (seeking to increase likelihood that institutional investors would
serve as lead plaintiffs).
207. See id. (recognizing that institutional investors have most to gain from
serving as lead plaintiff and that their role will benefit class and assist courts).
208. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, app. B, at 4 (state-
ment by Grant & Eisenhofer) (stating beauty contests employed by institutional
investors seeking lead counsel). But see In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d
943, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating that beauty contests are ineffective because no
plaintiff can engage in comprehensive study of law firms).
209. Cf S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (rec-
ognizing that institutional investors as lead plaintiffs can properly serve interests of
class).
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As a matter of public policy, auctions may discourage large investors
and institutional investors from serving as lead plaintiff.2 10 It has been
indicated that although the lead plaintiff is not compensated in class ac-
tions, the plaintiff expects to significantly influence the conduct of the
litigation.2 11 Auctions, however, may preclude the plaintiff from working
with his or her choice of counsel and exercising any influence over the
litigation. 2 12 As a result, if institutional investors as lead plaintiff lack in-
fluence over the litigation, they may decline to seek lead plaintiff appoint-
ment.213 Such an outcome is contrary to the intent and spirit of the
PSLRA, which is to attract large investors to serve and represent the inter-
ests of the class.2 14
Therefore, in accordance with the statutory text of the PSLRA and its
legislative history, courts should defer to the plaintiffs choice of counsel
under a standard of review similar to business judgment rule.215 Defer-
ence will allow the plaintiff to select and retain class counsel without un-
due interference by the court.2 16 Also, it should encourage large investors
210. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 93 ("Auctions would likely deter institutional
investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their reluctance
to take on the responsibility of the lead plaintiff position without the ability to
work with their choice of counsel.").
211. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, app. B, at 19-20
(statement by Lucian Bebchuck) (stating lead plaintiffs incentive for serving as
lead plaintiff). Because the lead plaintiff is not compensated for serving in the
litigation, one incentive to become an effective and active lead plaintiff in the in-
terest of the class-of a type contemplated by the PSLRA-arises "from combina-
tion of (i) having substantial stake and (ii) expecting that becoming lead plaintiff
would enable having significant influence of conduct of litigation." See id. (recog-
nizing reasons to serve as lead plaintiff).
212. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 56 (recognizing
auctions "interfere with ability of institutional investors to take active and meaning-
ful role in class action").
213. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 93 (stating "auctions likely will deter institu-
tional investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their reluc-
tance to take on responsibility of lead plaintiff position without ability to work with
their choice of counsel").
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (requiring that court appoint lead
plaintiff with largest financial interest); S. REp. No. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (seeking to increase likelihood that institutional investors
would serve as lead plaintiffs).
215. Cf In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating
that courts should employ deferential standard in reviewing lead plaintiffs choice
of counsel); In re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 486 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (stating that deference should be given to lead plaintiff's choice of
counsel); Fisch, supra note 8, at 94 (stating that courts are unsuited to choose class
counsel when lead plaintiff already negotiated with counsel); Third Circuit Task
Force Report, supra note 11, at 87 ("The PSLRA requires that the most adequate
plaintiff's choice of counsel is entitled to deference if it is the result of careful and
independent process.").
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or institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff because the court will not
interfere or second guess their choice of counsel. 2 17
The business judgment rule, however, still provides the court with the
ability to review the decision-making process of the plaintiff in selecting
class counsel.2 18 For instance, it allows the court to determine whether
the lead plaintiff negotiated at arms length with counsel, whether a rea-
sonable fee was made at the time of the agreement, and whether the lead
plaintiff was informed about the subject. 219 It does not, however, allow
the court to substitute its judgment for lead counsel over the judgment of
the lead plaintiff.220 As a result, the Task Force appropriately decided that
the business judgment rule provides the adequate protection and appro-
priate deference to the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel. 22 1
The Third Circuit in Cendant and the Northern District of California
in Copper Mountain correctly applied a deferential standard of review simi-
lar to the business judgment rule. 222 To illustrate, the Third Circuit
found that auctions are impermissible, and concluded that a "court should
generally employ a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff's
choices. It is not enough that the lead plaintiff selected counsel or negoti-
ated a retainer agreement that is different than what the court would have
done .... 223 In other words, the Third Circuit recognized that a court
should review the plaintiffs decision-making process and defer to that
choice provided it resulted from a reasonable and good faith process. 2 24
Likewise, in Copper Mountain, the Northern District of California prop-
erly found that a court should defer to the lead plaintiffs choice of coun-
sel if the plaintiff employed a reasonable decision-making process for
217. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 93 ("Auctions would likely deter institutional
investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their reluctance
to take on the responsibility of the lead plaintiff position without the ability to
work with their choice of counsel.").
218. Cf Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (applying business
judgment rule but evaluating decisionmaking process to determine if informed
and reasonable).
219. Cf BLOCK ET AL., supra note 137, at 45-47 (recognizing protections af-
forded under business judgment rule); EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 545 (same).
220. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 91 (stating that
court may not "impose its own counsel, by way of auction, against the lead plain-
tiff's wishes").
221. See id. at 87-88 (concluding that business judgment rule is appropriate
deference given to lead plaintiffs choice of counsel).
222. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274-77 (3d Cir. 2001) (stat-
ing courts should defer to business judgment of lead plaintiff unless it can be
shown that decision-making process was not arms-length or good-faith bargain); In
re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. at 475, 486 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(refusing to conduct auction if fee arrangement was reasonable and deferring in-
stead to lead plaintiffs choice of counsel).
223. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 274.
224. See id. at 276 (stating that court will evaluate decisionmaking process
under business judgment rule and if it finds plaintiff negotiated reasonably with
counsel then it will not second guess that decision).
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retaining counsel. 2 25 Consistent with the principles of the business judg-
ment rule, the court stated that "[i]f the court determines that the plain-
tiff with the largest loss has adequately negotiated with counsel, then the
adequacy requirement ... is met .... In the event of such a showing, the
court need not, and indeed should not, substitute its judgment for that of
the lead plaintiff."22 6 In short, both courts found, consistent with the Task
Force's findings, that a court should not interfere with a plaintiffs choice
of counsel if the decision was based on a reasonable, good-faith selection
process. 22 7
B. Appropriate Conditions for Conducting an Auction
Under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule, an
auction is appropriate only under very limited circumstances without vio-
lating the text of the PSLRA.228 Consistent with the statutory text, the
court is authorized only to approve or disapprove the lead plaintiffs
choice of counsel. 229 The court, however, is authorized to appoint the
most adequate plaintiff.230 If, for instance, the plaintiff consistently fails
to negotiate a fee that the court finds reasonable, the court can review the
adequacy of an alternate plaintiff who possess the next highest financial
interest. 23 1 If, however, no other plaintiffs are willing or able to serve as
lead plaintiff, the court properly may assume control of the litigation in
order to serve the interests of the class without violating the terms of the
PSLRA.2 32
225. See Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 486-89 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that
deference is given to plaintiff's choice of counsel because fee arrangement ap-
peared reasonable).
226. Id. at 482.
227. See id. at 486 (stating that court will defer to plaintiff's choice of counsel
if negotiated reasonably); Cendant, 264 F.3d at 276 (stating that court will defer if
lead plaintiff's choices were result of good faith selection and negotiation process
and were arrived at via meaningful arms-length bargaining).
228. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277 (stating circumstances that might arise
when auction is permissible); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 91
(acknowledging that case might arise when auction could be permitted). The
Task Force realized that a situation might arise in which "lead plaintiff ha[d] failed
to conduct adequate search for qualified counsel, and no other party has stepped
up with resources, experience and interest to conduct a true market search for and
negotiation with counsel." Id. In such circumstances, the Task Force admits that it
may designate a "most adequate plaintiff," as required under the statute, and find
it appropriate to conduct an auction. See id. (finding auction may be appropriate).
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (v) (2000) (recognizing that lead plain-
tiff's choice of counsel is subject to approval by court pursuant to lead counsel
provision).
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (providing court with authority to se-
lect most adequate plaintiff). For a further discussion on the selection of the lead
plaintiff, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
231. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a) (3) (B) (providing that lead plaintiff provision
requires court to choose most adequate plaintiff).
232. Cf id. (finding that lead plaintiff and lead counsel must be appointed in
order for class action to proceed).
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In support, the Northern District of California, the Third Circuit and
the Third Circuit Task Force agree that under these limited circumstances
a court-ordered auction may be appropriate without violating the
PSLRA.23 3 Because the court must obtain a reasonable fee arrangement,
it may opt for an auction to achieve this result.
234
C. The Court, Not the Lead Plaintiff Should Conduct the Auction
As shown, an auction may be appropriate in a situation where a court
finds no adequate plaintiff who is willing or able to negotiate a fee agree-
ment with counsel and the class action is well-suited to proceed.2 3 5 In
Network Associates, the Northern District of California misconstrued this
test by requiring the lead plaintiff to conduct the auction when the plain-
tiffs counsel was unable to serve as lead counsel. 2 36 Rather than deter-
mining the plaintiffs ability to seek another counsel, the court improperly
ordered the plaintiff to conduct an auction.2 37 The auction, as a result,
interfered with the plaintiff's ability to choose its own counsel. 238 Instead,
the court should have afforded the lead plaintiff with an opportunity to
choose counsel before even considering an auction.2 39
233. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277 (stating that if none of possible lead plain-
tiffs are adequate then it might be permissible for court to conduct auction); In re
Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 491 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (same); Third Circuit
Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 91 (same). The Task Force agreed that there
may exist circumstances when an auction may be appropriate:
a case might arise in which the putative lead plaintiff has failed to con-
duct an adequate search for qualified counsel, and no other party has
stepped up with the resources, experience and interest to conduct a true
market search for and negotiation with counsel, i.e., a sophisticated inves-
tor who has suffered substantial economic loss. In these very limited cir-
cumstances, the Task Force does not rule out the possibility that the court
may designate a "most adequate plaintiff"-as is required under the stat-
ute-and yet find it appropriate to employ [] an auction.
Id.
234. Compare Quintus, 201 F.R.D. at 490 (stating that auction is appropriate
because plaintiff was unable to select lead counsel, all other prospective plaintiffs
were incapable of negotiating competitive fee arrangement and class action was
well-suited to proceed), with Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277 (stating that if litigant repeat-
edly undertakes flawed process of selecting and retaining lead counsel and none of
possible lead plaintiffs are capable of serving as lead plaintiff, then court may as-
sume direct control over counsel selection and hold auction).
235. For a discussion on permissibility of auctions, see supra notes 228-34 and
accompanying text.
236. See In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (noting that court held auction before determining whether plaintiff
was incapable of making this decision).
237. See id. (holding that plaintiff conduct auction).
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (stating that lead plaintiff chooses coun-
sel); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (stating that
investors should be empowered to choose counsel).
239. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (recognizing that court only has authority
under PSLRA to approve lead plaintiffs choice of counsel).
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In selecting the lead plaintiff, the PSLRA permits a court to aggregate
the financial interests of a small number of investors provided the court
determines that the group adequately represents the interests of the class.
This conclusion is consistent with the statutory text and the legislative his-
tory of the PSLRA. Aggregating, however, a large number of investors
with small financial interests in the outcome of the litigation is inconsis-
tent with the statutory text. In selecting the lead counsel, a court must
defer to a lead plaintiffs choice of counsel under the business judgment
rule but may consider auctioning this position only if all plaintiffs are inad-
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